Influence, Bribery, and Manipulation in Voting Systems

Giovedi' 16 Giugno 2011 - Nicholas Mattei


Giovedi' 16 Giugno 2011 alle ore 17:00 in aula 2BC60 Nicholas Mattei (University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky) terra' un seminario dal titolo "Influence, Bribery, and Manipulation in Voting Systems".

Computational Social Choice (ComSoc) is an emergent and vibrant area of research in Computer Science. ComSoc, in broad terms, is concerned with the design and analysis of systems and processes for collective decision making. Voting and election procedures are common ways that groups of agents can arrive at a collective decision. Unfortunately, foundational results in the field of Social Choice prove that it is impossible to devise a voting procedure for three or more candidates that is immune to manipulation (some agent will, in some cases, have an incentive to misrepresent his true preferences). Our research focuses on the manipulation as well as bribery problems in voting procedures. Most research related to bribery and manipulation assumes an agent has access to perfect information about the preferences of all agents within the system. Our research focuses on the case where an agent only has access to probabilistic information about other agents’ preferences. This talk will provide a brief introduction to ComSoc, a review of some major results related to election systems, and an overview of our work on election systems where voters’ preferences are modeled as probabilities.

Nicholas Mattei ( e' un brillante studente di dottorato dell'Universita' del Kentucky, che e' in visita presso il dipartimento fino al 15 Luglio 2011 grazie ad un finanziamento dell'NSF per il convegno IJCAI 2011.

Rif. int. F. Rossi