

# Mean-Field Games in Padova

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- Part I: A brief introduction to MFGs
  - ▶ Motivations and heuristic derivation of MFG systems
  - ▶ Some basic results and a list of applications.
- Part II: some contributions by the group in Padova
  - ▶ 1. Non-uniqueness and Uniqueness [M.B., Fischer] :
  - ▶ 2. Robust and risk-sensitive MFGs [M.B., Cirant]
  - ▶ 3. Systems driven by jump processes and fractional MFGs [M. Cirant and A. Goffi]
  - ▶ 4. Problems with concentration phenomena. [M. Cirant and A. Cesaroni]
  - ▶ 5. Time-periodic solutions [M. Cirant et al.]
  - ▶ 6. Deterministic MFGs [C. Marchi, P. Mannucci et al.]

# Multiagent systems

Consider a population of  $N$  agents, whose state is driven by

$$dX_s^i = \alpha_s^i ds + \sigma^i dW_s^i, \quad s > t, \quad X_t^i = x^i \in \mathbf{R}^d, \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

$W_s^i$  independent Brownian motions,  $\alpha_s^i =$  control of  $i$ -th player, and a finite horizon cost functional of the  $i$ -th player:

$$J_T^i(t, x^1, \dots, x^N, \alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^N) := \mathbf{E} \left[ \int_t^T L^i(\alpha_s^i) + F^i \left( X_s^i, \frac{\sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{X_s^k}}{N-1} \right) ds \right],$$

- $L^i$  is the running cost of using the control  $\alpha_s^i$ ,
- $F^i : \mathbf{R}^d \times \{ \text{prob. measures} \} \rightarrow \{ \text{Lip functions} \}$ ,  $\delta_x$  is the Dirac mass at  $x$

N.B.:  $J_T^i$  depends on the players  $k \neq i$  only via their **empirical measure**  
 $\frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \delta_{X_s^k}$

# Nash equilibrium feedbacks for $N$ -person games

N. E. are  $N$ -tuple of individual feedbacks  $(\bar{\alpha}^1, \dots, \bar{\alpha}^N)$  such that

$$J_T^i(\bar{\alpha}_1, \dots, \bar{\alpha}_N) \leq J_T^i(\bar{\alpha}_1, \dots, \bar{\alpha}_{i-1}, \alpha_i, \bar{\alpha}_{i+1}, \dots, \bar{\alpha}_N) \quad \forall \alpha_i \quad \forall i.$$

In principle such equilibria can be synthesised by solving a system of  $N$  parabolic HJB PDEs in  $Nd$  dimensions for the value functions  $v_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$ , nonlinear and strongly coupled (e.g., Bensoussan and Frehse books and papers, '80s - now)

This is highly unfeasible in practice, especially if  $d$  or  $N$  are large (curse of dimensionality already for  $N = 1$ .....).

Moreover, Nash equilibria are highly non-unique and unstable.

**Problem:** if the players can be assumed to have the same parameters (e.g., agents in the stock market, families consuming energy...), can we give a macroscopic description of the whole population simpler to handle?

Similar ideas: kinetic models in gas dynamics, mean-field theories in Quantum Physics...

# Heuristic derivation of the MFG equations

Assume identical players:

$$\sigma^i = \sigma, \quad L^i = L, \quad F^i = F, \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

The dynamics of a generic agent is

$$dX_s = \alpha_s ds + \sigma dW_s, \quad X_t = x \in \mathbf{R}^d$$

with  $W_s$  a Brownian motion,  $\alpha_s = \text{control}$ ,  $\sigma > 0$  **volatility**,  
and the his cost functional is

$$J_T(t, x, \alpha) := \mathbf{E} \left[ \int_t^T L(\alpha_s) + F(X_s, m_{env}(s)) ds \right] + G(X_T, m_{env}(T)),$$

where  $m_{env}(s)$  is the **distribution of the other agents** in the environment, assumed given,  $g$  is the terminal cost.

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where  $m_{env}(s)$  is the **distribution of the other agents** in the environment, assumed given,  $g$  is the terminal cost.

Define the value function

$$v(t, x) := \inf_{\alpha} J_T(t, x, \alpha).$$

Then  $v(t, x)$  solves the **Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman** equation

$$\begin{cases} -\frac{\partial v}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta v + H(\nabla v) = F(x, m_{env}) & \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ v(T, x) = G(x, m_{env}) \end{cases}$$

where  $\nu := \sigma^2/2$ ,  $\Delta := \Delta_x$ ,  $\nabla := \nabla_x$ , and  $H$  is the Hamiltonian associated to  $L$ :

$$H(p) := \sup_{\alpha \in \mathbf{R}^d} \{p \cdot \alpha - L(\alpha)\}$$

Moreover the **feedback control**

$$\hat{\alpha}(t, x) = -\nabla H(\nabla v(t, x))$$

is **optimal**.

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The optimal process

$$d\hat{X}_t = -\nabla H(\nabla v(\hat{X}_t))dt + \sigma dW_t$$

has a distribution whose density  $m$  solves the

Kolmogorov-Fokker-Plank equation

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla v)) = 0 & \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ m(0, x) = m_o(x) \end{cases}$$

where  $m_o \geq 0$ ,  $\int_{\mathbf{R}^d} m_o(x) dx = 1$ ,

is the distribution of the initial position of the system.

The PDEs for value and density of the optimal process are

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} -\frac{\partial v}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta v + H(\nabla v) = F(x, m_{env}) \quad \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ \frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla v)) = 0 \quad \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ v(T, x) = G(x, m_{env}), \quad m(0, x) = m_o(x), \end{array} \right.$$

and  $m_{env} \mapsto v$ ,  $v \mapsto m$  are well-defined maps.

If  $m_{env} \mapsto v \mapsto m$  has a fixed point, i.e.  $m = m_{env}$ ,

then  $m$  is an equilibrium distribution of the agents,

each behaving optimally as long as the population distribution remains the same.

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# Mean Field Games PDEs

We have heuristically derived the basic system of 2 evolutive PDEs of MFGs

$$(MFE) \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} -\frac{\partial v}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta v + H(\nabla v) = F(x, m(t)) \quad \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ \frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - \nu \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla v)) = 0 \quad \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ v(T, x) = G(x, m(T)), \quad m(0, x) = m_o(x), \end{array} \right.$$

**Data:**  $\nu, H, F, m_o, g$ ;      **Unknowns:**

$m(t, x)$  = equilibrium distribution of the agents at time  $t$ ;

$v(t, x)$  = value function of the representative agent

1st equation is backward parabolic H-J-B with a possibly non-local cost term  $F(x, m)$ ,

2nd equation is forward parabolic K-F-P equation, linear in  $m$ .

3rd line: terminal and initial conditions.

# Well-posedness?

**Existence:** proved under various different sets of assumptions:

**J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions** (2006 -...) , mostly for periodic data and boundary conditions, i.e. on the torus  $\mathbb{T}^d$  instead of  $\mathbf{R}^d$ ,

see [**P. Cardaliaguet, Notes 2010**],

**M. Huang, P. Caines and R. Malhame** (2006 -...), mostly for LQG models,

**Carmona and Delarue** by probabilistic methods, two huge books 2018.

**Uniqueness:** is not expected in general, true for

- $H$  convex under the increasing **monotonicity** condition on the costs

$$\int_{\mathbf{R}^d} [F(x, m_1) - F(x, m_2)] d(m_1 - m_2)(x) > 0, \quad \forall m_1 \neq m_2,$$

which means **crowd aversion** (Lasry-Lions), idem for  $G$ .

- for small data or short horizon  $T$ : less known until recently, see below...

# The large population limit

1. Synthesis of  $\varepsilon$ -Nash equilibria (Huang-Caines-Malhame 2006):

given a solution  $(v, m)$  of the PDE system (MFE) the candidate optimal feedback is  $\hat{\alpha}(t, x) := -\nabla H(\nabla v(t, x))$ .

Assume all the players use this feedback:  $\tilde{\alpha}_s^i := \hat{\alpha}(s, X_s^i)$ .

Then  $\forall \varepsilon > 0 \exists N_\varepsilon$  such that  $\forall N \geq N_\varepsilon, \forall i = 1, \dots, N, \forall$  admissible  $\alpha^i$ ,

$$J_T^i(t, x^1, \dots, x^N, \tilde{\alpha}^1, \dots, \tilde{\alpha}^N) \leq J_T^i(t, x^1, \dots, x^N, \tilde{\alpha}^1, \dots, \alpha^i, \dots, \tilde{\alpha}^N) + \varepsilon$$

2. Convergence of Nash equilibria for  $N$  person games to a MF equilibrium and rigorous derivation of the MFG system: much more complicated.

2a. For problem with ergodic cost functional: Lasry-Lions 2006, M.B. - F. Priuli 2014 (LQG models)

2b. By the Probabilistic approach to MFG : M. Fischer 14, D. Lacker 14 -18,

2c. Convergence of solutions of the system of  $N$  HJB PDEs for the **finite horizon** problem to a solution of the evolutive MFG system of PDEs (MFE):

Cardaliaguet - Delarue - Lasry - Lions preprint 9/2015, book to appear.

Problem is related to **propagation of chaos** in statistical physics.

Covers also the case of **common noise**, i.e., the noises  $W_s^i$  are NOT independent.

Main tool: the **master equation**, a fully nonlinear PDE in **infinite dimensions**.

## Examples of applications:

### ● Economics

- ▶ financial markets (price formation and dynamic equilibria, formation of volatility)
- ▶ general economic equilibrium with rational expectations
- ▶ environmental policy,

### ● Engineering

- ▶ wireless power control
- ▶ demand side management in electric power networks,
- ▶ traffic problems

### ● Social sciences

- ▶ crowd motion (mexican wave "la ola", pedestrian dynamics, congestion phenomena,...)
- ▶ opinion dynamics and consensus problems,
- ▶ models of population distribution (e.g., segregation).



## Part II. 1. Non-uniqueness of solutions

Notation: Mean of  $\mu \in \mathcal{P}_1(\mathbb{R}^n)$ ,  $M(\mu) := \int_{\mathbb{R}} y \mu(dy)$ .

Theorem (An explicit example, M.B. - M. Fischer 2018)

Assume  $d = 1$ ,  $H(p) = |p|$  (i.e., control  $\alpha \in [-1, 1]$ ),

$F, G \in C^1$ ,  $\nu > 0$ ,  $M(m_0) = 0$ , and

$$F(x, \mu) = \beta x M(\mu), \quad G(x, \mu) = \gamma x M(\mu), \quad \beta, \gamma \in \mathbf{R}.$$

Then, if  $\beta \leq 0$ ,  $\gamma < 0$ ,  $\forall T > 0 \exists$  solutions  $(v, m)$ ,  $(\bar{v}, \bar{m})$  with

$$v_x(t, x) < 0, \quad \bar{v}_x(t, x) > 0 \quad \text{for all } 0 < t < T.$$

If, instead,  $\beta > 0$ ,  $\gamma \geq 0$ , the solution is unique.

If  $\beta < 0, \gamma < 0$  an agent has a **negative cost**, i.e., a reward, for having a **position  $x$  with the same sign as the average position  $M(m)$**  of the whole population.

Conversely, the conditions for **uniqueness** express **aversion to crowd**.

# Thm. [B.-Fischer]: uniqueness for short horizon in $\mathbf{R}^d$

Assume  $H \in C^2$  with respect to  $p$ ,  $m_0 \in \mathcal{P} \cap L^\infty(\mathbf{R}^d)$ ,

$$\|F(\cdot, \mu) - F(\cdot, \bar{\mu})\|_2 \leq L_F \|\mu - \bar{\mu}\|_2,$$

$$\|DG(\cdot, \mu) - DG(\cdot, \bar{\mu})\|_2 \leq L_G \|\mu - \bar{\mu}\|_2$$

Then any  $(v_1, m_1), (v_2, m_2)$  two classical solutions of the MFG PDEs  $(v_1, m_1), (v_2, m_2)$  coincide if

- either the time horizon  $T$  is **small** enough
- or  $L_F, L_G$  are **small**
- or  $\sup |D_p^2 H(x, Dv_i)|$   $i = 1, 2$ , is **small**.

Remark: **no convexity** assumption on  $H$ , **nor monotonicity** of  $F$  and  $G$ , but the **minimal regularity** of  $H$  is  $C^{1,1}$  : see the preceding counterexample!

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## II.2: Robust control

Consider a stochastic control system with an additional **disturbance**  $\beta$

$$dX_s = [f(X_s) + g(X_s)\alpha_s + \tau(X_s)\beta_s] ds + \sigma dW_s, \quad X_t = x$$

with  $\tau$  a given matrix, and  $\beta$  an UNKNOWN disturbance modeled as an **adversary** choosing a control function whereas  $\alpha$  plays causal strategies: a **0-sum differential game**. The value function is, for  $\delta > 0$

$$V(x) := \inf_{\alpha} \sup_{\beta} \mathbf{E} \left[ \int_t^T L(\alpha[\beta]_s) + F(X_s) - \frac{\delta}{2} |\beta_s|^2 ds + G(X_T) \right]$$

with  $\beta$  open loop control and  $\alpha[\cdot]$  non-anticipating strategy.

The H-J-Isaacs equation associated to  $V$  by Dynamic Programming is

$$-v_t + H(x, Dv) = \nu \Delta v + F(x)$$

$$H(x, p) := \inf_{b \in \mathbf{R}^m} \sup_{a \in A} [-(f(x) + g(x)a + \tau(x)b) \cdot p - L(a) + \frac{\delta}{2} |b|^2]$$

$$= \sup_{a \in A} [(-f(x) - g(x)a) \cdot p - L(a)] - |\tau(x)^T p|^2$$

# The PDE system for robust MFG

For the previous **nonconvex**  $H$  we derive heuristically the MFG system

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} -v_t + H(x, Dv) = \nu \Delta v + F(x, m(t, \cdot)) \\ v(T, x) = G(x, m(T, \cdot)) \\ m_t - \operatorname{div}(D_p H(x, Dv)m) = \nu \Delta m \\ m(0, x) = m_0(x), \end{array} \right.$$

Known partial results

- Bauso, Tembine, Basar 2016: **model** and **numerical simulations**, no rigorous results
- Moon, Basar 2017: LQ risk-sensitive and robust MFG (also Bauso, Mylvaganam, Astolfi 2016; Huang, Huang 2017)

# Robust MFG with bounded state domain

For a bounded smooth domain  $\Omega$  consider the trajectories of the system that are **reflected at the boundary** of  $\Omega$  : this leads to Neumann boundary conditions for the H-J-I and KFP equations ( $n$  is the exterior normal):

$$\partial_n v = 0, \quad \partial_n m + m D_p H(x, Du) \cdot n = 0 \quad \text{on } \partial\Omega \times (0, T)$$

## Theorem (M.B. - Cirant 2018)

Assume  $F, G$  regularizing and Lip in  $L^2$ ,  $m_0 \in C^{2,\beta}(\bar{\Omega})$  satisfying the compatibility condition

$$\partial_n m_0(x) - m_0(x) f(x) \cdot n(x) = 0 \quad \forall x \in \partial\Omega. \quad \text{Then}$$

- for all  $T > 0$  there is a classical solution of the robust MFG system with Neumann conditions,
- there exists  $\bar{T} > 0$  such that for all  $T \in (0, \bar{T}]$  such solution is **unique**.

## II.3 The fractional MFG system, [Cirant - A. Goffi '18]

The MFG system involving **the fractional Laplacian** operator  $(-\Delta)^s$  instead of the usual Laplacian is

$$(1) \quad \begin{cases} -\partial_t u + (-\Delta)^s u + H(x, Du) = F[m](x) & \text{in } \mathbb{T}^d \times (0, T) \\ \partial_t m + (-\Delta)^s m - \operatorname{div}(m D_p H(x, Du)) = 0 & \text{in } \mathbb{T}^d \times (0, T) \\ m(x, 0) = m_0(x), u(x, T) = u_T(x) & \text{in } \mathbb{T}^d, \end{cases}$$

where  $H = H(x, p) \sim C_H |Du|^\gamma$ ,  $\gamma > 1$  for  $|p|$  large,  $F$  is a regularizing coupling,  $u_T \in C^{4+\alpha}(\mathbb{T}^d)$ ,  $m_0 \in C^{4+\alpha}(\mathbb{T}^d)$ ,  $\mathbb{T}^d = d$ -dimensional torus.

**Remark.** Such systems arise when the underlying dynamics is driven by a **2s-stable Lévy process** instead of the Brownian motion.

**Motivations.** Systems with nonlocal diffusion have been introduced by [Chan-Sircar '17] in MFG economic models; diffusion processes with jumps have an increasing importance in financial models.

**Remark .** Stationary case in [A. Cesaroni, M. Cirant et al '17].

# The Fractional Laplacian

Classical definitions: for  $s \in (0, 1)$

- As integro-differential operator

$$(-\Delta)^s u(x) = c_{d,s} \text{P.V.} \int_{\mathbf{R}^d} \frac{u(x) - u(y)}{|x - y|^{d+2s}} dy$$

- Via Fourier transform

$$(-\Delta)^s u = \mathcal{F}^{-1}(|\xi|^{2s}(\mathcal{F}u))$$



# PDEs with fractional diffusion: Local vs Nonlocal

The Laplacian may be defined in  $\mathbf{R}$  as follows

$$(2) \quad (-\Delta u)(x) = \lim_{y \rightarrow 0} 2 \frac{u(x) - \frac{u(x+y)+u(x-y)}{2}}{|y|^2}.$$

The fractional Laplacian can be written as

$$(-\Delta)^s u(x) = c_s \int_{\mathbf{R}} \frac{u(x) - u(x-y)}{|y|^{1+2s}} dy = c_s \int_{\mathbf{R}} \frac{u(x) - u(x+\tilde{y})}{|\tilde{y}|^{1+2s}} d\tilde{y}.$$

After computing the average we get

$$(3) \quad (-\Delta)^s u(x) = c_s \int_{\mathbf{R}} \frac{u(x) - \frac{u(x+y)+u(x-y)}{2}}{|y|^{1+2s}} dy$$

The main difference is that to compute (2) it is sufficient to know only the value of  $u$  in a neighborhood of  $x$ , while for (3) we need to know the value of  $u$  in the whole real line.

**Remark.** This is why such PIDE are usually called **nonlocal**.

**Existence** is tackled via vanishing viscosity, namely one considers the viscous system

$$(4) \quad \begin{cases} -\partial_t u - \sigma \Delta u + (-\Delta)^s u + H(x, Du) = F[m](x) & \text{in } Q_T \\ \partial_t m - \sigma \Delta m + (-\Delta)^s m - \operatorname{div}(m D_p H(x, Du)) = 0 & \text{in } Q_T \\ m(x, 0) = m_0(x), \quad u(x, T) = u_T(x) & \text{in } \mathbb{T}^d. \end{cases}$$

and then pass to the limit as  $\sigma \rightarrow 0$ .

### Theorem (Existence for the viscous system (4))

*Under the previous assumptions on  $H$  and  $F$ , for all  $\sigma > 0$  and  $s \in (0, 1)$ , there exists a classical solution  $(u_\sigma, m_\sigma)$  to the viscous (fractional) MFG system (4).*

- **Semiconcavity estimates** independent of  $\sigma$  for the solution  $u$  of the HJB equation  $\rightsquigarrow$  uniform **Lipschitz estimates** via **duality methods**.
- Some **estimates** independent of  $\sigma$  for the solution  $m$  of the FP equation and its time derivative in some **energy spaces of the form**  $L^2(0, T; W^{\mu, 2}(\mathbb{T}^d))$  for some  $\mu \in \mathbf{R}$ .

# Existence and regularity of solutions

## Theorem

Let  $H$  be convex. Under the same assumptions of the above result, let  $(u_\sigma, m_\sigma)$  be a solution to (4). Then, as  $\sigma \rightarrow 0$  and up to subsequences,  $u_\sigma \rightarrow u$  uniformly,  $Du_\sigma \rightarrow Du$  strongly,  $m_\sigma \rightarrow m$  weakly.

- If  $s \in (0, 1/2]$ , then  $(u, m)$  is a **weak energy solution** to (1).
- If  $s \in (1/2, 1)$ , then  $\partial_t u, \partial_t m, (-\Delta)^s u, (-\Delta)^s m$  belong to some  $C^{\bar{\alpha}, \frac{\bar{\alpha}}{2s}}(Q_T)$ ,  $\bar{\alpha} \in (0, 1)$ , and  $(u, m)$  is **classical solution** to (1).

**Regularity:** Generalize the classical spaces  $C^{2+\alpha, 1+\alpha/2}$  and  $W_p^{2,1}$ , associated to the heat operator  $\partial_t - \Delta$ , to the operator  $\partial_t + (-\Delta)^s$ :

- **Fractional parabolic Hölder spaces**
- **Parabolic Bessel potential spaces**

# Uniqueness of solutions, perspectives

## Theorem

System (1) admits a unique solution in the following cases:

- (a)  $F$  monotone as before and  $H$  convex ;
- (b) for short horizon: for  $s \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ , there exists  $T^* > 0$ , depending on  $d, s, H, F, m_0, u_T$  such that for all  $T \in (0, T^*]$ , (1) has at most a solution  $(u, m)$ .

- The approach extends to  $\mathbf{R}^d$  and to more general integro-differential operators

$$\mathcal{I}[u](x, t) = \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} u(x + z, t) - u(x, t) - Du(x, t) \cdot z \nu(dz)$$

where  $\nu$  is a Lévy measure, as appearing in [finance models](#).

- Similar procedures work for MFG models with Caputo [time-fractional derivative](#) [F. Camilli - A. Goffi, ongoing], being mostly based on results for abstract evolution equations.

## II.4 Beyond the monotonicity of the costs

MFGs with costs  $F$  **increasing** with respect to  $m$  has been treated in generality with several techniques and carry many good properties:

- **uniqueness** of solutions,
- **regularity** of solutions as a byproduct of “competition” effects,
- **stability** in the long time regime, i.e. convergence of the time-dependent problem to the stationary one corresponding to ergodic control.

However, very seldom this assumption is satisfied in applications, e.g. [Gonzalez, Gualdani, Sola-Morales, 16], [Carmona, Graves, 18], [Hongler et al., 16], multi-population [Achdou-Bardi-Cirant, 16], ...

**M. Cirant** explored MFG systems when  $f(\cdot, x)$  is **not** increasing, in particular: **non-uniqueness**, **concentration** phenomena and **pattern formation** in the long time regime.

# MFGs with decreasing costs [Cirant, 16]

The MFG PDEs for **ergodic control problems**, i.e.,

cost functional =  $\lim_{T \rightarrow +\infty} \frac{1}{T} \mathbf{E}[\int_0^T (L(\alpha_s) + F(X_s, m(s))) ds]$

are stationary with an additive eigenvalue  $\lambda = \text{constant value function}$ :

$$(5) \quad \begin{cases} -\epsilon \Delta u + H(\nabla u) + \lambda = f(x, m(x)) \approx -c m^\alpha + V(x) \\ -\epsilon \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla u)) = 0, \quad \int m = 1, \quad m > 0. \end{cases}$$

model problem describing “**aggregation**”, i.e., cost **decreasing** w.r.t  $m$ .

## Theorem

Suppose that  $H \approx |p|^\gamma$ ,  $\gamma > 1$ . Two main regimes are identified:

- **Subcritical**: if  $\alpha < \gamma'/d$ , there exists a smooth solution  $(u, \lambda, m)$ ; if  $\gamma'/d \leq \alpha < \gamma'/(d - \gamma')$  a solution exists under additional smallness conditions on  $c$ .
- **Supercritical**: if  $\alpha > \gamma'/(d - \gamma')$ , (5) may not have solutions.

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# Concentration of mass in the small noise limit

[Cirant-Cesaroni, 19]

Concentration phenomena for ergodic problems in the vanishing viscosity regime  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$

$$(6) \quad \begin{cases} -\epsilon \Delta u + H(\nabla u) + \lambda = f(x, m(x)) \approx -m^\alpha + V(x) \\ -\epsilon \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla u)) = 0, \quad \int_{\mathbf{R}^d} m = 1, \quad m > 0. \end{cases}$$

## Theorem

Under the assumptions that  $V(\infty) = +\infty$  and  $\alpha$  be “subcritical”,

- For all  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$  there exists a triple  $(u_\epsilon, m_\epsilon, \lambda_\epsilon)$  solving (6).
- There exist sequences  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$  and  $x_\epsilon \in \mathbf{R}^d$ , such that for all  $\eta > 0$  there exists  $R_\epsilon \rightarrow 0$  s.t.,

$$\int_{B(x_\epsilon, R_\epsilon)} m_\epsilon dx \geq 1 - \eta,$$

and  $x_\epsilon$  approaches one of the (flattest) **minima** of  $V$ .



## II. 5 Time-periodic solutions [Cirant et al.]

The existence of periodic in time solutions to the parabolic system

$$\begin{cases} -\partial_t u - \Delta u + H(\nabla u) = f(m(x, t)) & \text{on } \mathbb{T}^d \times (-\infty, +\infty) \\ \partial_t m - \Delta m - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla u)) = 0 \end{cases}$$

has been obtained in [Cirant, Cirant-Nurbekyan 18]. The issue arises naturally in **economic** models, and was numerically observed in multi-population models of segregation [Achdou-M.B.-Cirant, 17].

### Theorem

$f'(1) < -4\pi^2 \implies \exists$  **non-trivial solutions**  $(u_n, m_n)$ , defined for  $t \in (-\infty, +\infty)$ , approaching a trivial solution  $(f(1)t, 1)$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , and  $T_n > 0$  such that  $m_n(\cdot, t) = m_n(\cdot, t + T_n)$  for all  $t$ .

Proof by **bifurcation** methods. Bifurcation suggests (see also [Cirant, Verzini 17]) that when the cost is not increasing, it is natural to expect the existence of **several families of solutions**.

## II. 6 Deterministic Mean Field Games

If the system is noiseless  $\dot{X}_s = \alpha_s$ , i.e.,  $\sigma = 0 = \nu$ , the MFG PDEs formally become

$$\begin{cases} -\frac{\partial v}{\partial t} + H(\nabla v) = F(x, m) & \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ \frac{\partial m}{\partial t} - \operatorname{div}(m \nabla H(\nabla v)) = 0 & \text{in } (0, T) \times \mathbf{R}^d \\ v(T, x) = G(x, m(T)), \quad m(0, x) = m_0(x). \end{cases}$$

**Troubles:**  $v$  solving the HJB equation is not smooth, the vector field  $\nabla H(\nabla v)$  can be undefined and discontinuous.

However,  $H(p) \rightarrow +\infty$  as  $|p| \rightarrow \infty$  and  $F, G$  smooth imply  $v$  is **semiconcave** in  $x$ , i.e., for some  $C > 0$   $x \mapsto v(x, t) - C|x|^2$  is concave, which implies  $\nabla H(\nabla v) \in L^\infty$ .

Then the system has a solution with the HJB equation satisfied in "viscosity sense" and KFP in the sense of distributions [Cardaliaguet, Notes 2010].

# Non-coercive first order Mean Field Games

P. Mannucci, C. Marchi, C. Mariconda, N. Tchou '19

$$\begin{cases} -\partial_t u + H(x, Du) = F(x, m) & \mathbb{R}^2 \times (0, T) \\ \partial_t m - \operatorname{div}(m \partial_p H(x, Du)) = 0 & \mathbb{R}^2 \times (0, T) \\ m(x, 0) = m_0(x), u(x, T) = G(x, m(T)) & \mathbb{R}^2 \end{cases}$$

$$H(x, p) = \frac{1}{2}(p_1^2 + h(x_1)^2 p_2^2), \quad p = (p_1, p_2), \quad x = (x_1, x_2).$$

$h \in C^2(\mathbb{R})$  is bounded and **possibly vanishing**, e.g.,

$$h(x_1) = \frac{x_1}{(1 + x_1^2)^{1/2}} \quad (\text{or also } h(x_1) = \sin x_1).$$

These systems arise when the generic player wants to choose the control  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \in L^2([t, T]; \mathbf{R}^2)$  so to minimize the cost

$$\int_t^T \left[ \frac{1}{2} |\alpha(\tau)|^2 + F(x(\tau), m) \right] d\tau + G(x(T), m(T))$$

with the dynamics  $x(\cdot)$  is

$$\begin{cases} x_1'(s) = \alpha_1(s), & x_1(t) = x_1 \\ x_2'(s) = h(x_1(s)) \alpha_2(s), & x_2(t) = x_2. \end{cases}$$

When  $h = 0$ :  $x_1 = 0$  is a **forbidden** direction.

### Theorem

$\|F(\cdot, m)\|_{C^2} \leq C$ ,  $\|G(\cdot, m)\|_{C^2} \leq C$  for all  $m \in \mathcal{P}_1$

$\implies$  exists a solution to the MFG system.

# MFG with control on acceleration (double integrator)

Y. Achdou, P. Mannucci, C. Marchi, N. Tchou

The generic player wants to choose the control  $\alpha$  so to minimize

$$\int_t^T \left[ \frac{1}{2} |\alpha(\tau)|^2 + F(x(\tau), v(\tau), m) \right] d\tau + G(x(T), m(T))$$

where  $F$  and  $G$  are  $C^2$ -bounded and  $x(\cdot)$  is the **double integrator**

$$\begin{cases} x'(s) = v(s) \\ v'(s) = \alpha(s). \end{cases}$$

The MFG system is

$$\begin{cases} -\partial_t u + H(x, v, D_x u, D_v u) = F(x, v, m) & \mathbb{R}^{2N} \times (0, T) \\ \partial_t m - \operatorname{div}(m \partial_p H(x, v, D_x u, D_v u)) = 0 & \mathbb{R}^{2N} \times (0, T) \\ m(x, 0) = m_0(x), u(x, T) = G(x, m(T)) & \mathbb{R}^{2N} \end{cases}$$

$$H(x, v, p_x, p_v) = \frac{1}{2} |p_v|^2 - v \cdot p_x, \quad (x, v) \in \mathbb{R}^{2N}, p = (p_x, p_v).$$

Thanks for your attention !