Classical studies of strategic voting have mostly focused on a single agent acting in conditions of perfect information. This approach has moved in recent years towards a study of manipulation as a repeated process or with the use of game theoretical notions. The aim of this workshop is to foster collaboration among researchers on these topics.
This workshop is supported by the COST action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.

Here is a picture of the blackboard summarising open questions raised during the workshop.

Date

January 23rd: from 9:00 to 18:00
January 24th: from 9:00 to 12:30

Location

Department of Mathematics
Via Trieste, 63 - Padova (Italy)
Meeting Room VII floor (stair B)


Program

January 23rd
Chair: Umberto Grandi
9:00-10:00 Maria Polukarov "Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting"
10:00-10:30 Coffee break
10:30-11:30 Ulle Endriss "Voter Response to Iterated Poll Information"
11:30-12:30 Andrea Loreggia "Beneficial Strategic Reasoning in Iterative Voting"
12:30-14:30 Lunch (on your own, we have reserved places at Caffetteria Berchet)
Chair: Ulle Endriss
14:30-15:30 St├ęphane Airiau "Iterated Majority Voting"
15:30-16:00 Coffee break
16:00-17:00 Umberto Grandi "Games Manipulators Play"
17:00-18:00 Paolo Turrini "Pre-vote Negotiations and the Outcome of Collective Decisions"
19:30 Social Dinner at PePen (map)

January 24th
Chair: Umberto Grandi
9:30-10:30 Rump Session: Coffee & Discussion
Chair: Maria Polukarov
10:30-11:30 Vangelis Markakis "Plurality Voting with Truth-biased Agents"
11:30-12:30 Simina Branzei "Truthful verifiable mechanisms"

Contacts

Local organizers:
Francesca Rossi (frossiATmath.unipd.it)
Umberto Grandi (umberto.uniATgmail.com)
Cristina Cornelio (cornelioATmath.unipd.it)
Andrea Loreggia (loreggiaATmath.unipd.it)